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Kafka Across the Intertexts: 
On Authority in Translation 
Patrick O'Neill 
"Someone must have traduced Joseph K., for without having done 
anything wrong he was arrested one fine morning," Willa and Edwin 
Muir felicitously open their 1937 translation of Franz Kaflca's novel The 
Trial, though in later editions the expression "traduced" is replaced by 
the more quotidian "been telling lies about" (1970, p. 1). The present 
paper is concerned with the traducing not of Joseph K. but of Franz 
Kafka — with the translation of Kafka, that is to say, for while one 
now obsolete meaning of the verb "to traduce" is indeed "to translate," 
its only current meaning is precisely "to tell lies about," and in one 
sense translation is always a calculated process of telling lies about its 
object of interest.1 Kafka, after all, clearly wanted his text to read 
neither "Someone must have traduced Joseph K." nor "Someone must 
1. Earlier versions of this paper were delivered to audiences at 
McMaster University, the University of Toronto, Queen's University, 
Laurentian University, the University of Victoria, the University of 
British Columbia, and the University of Manitoba. My thanks are due 
to all of these groups for valuable feedback, as also to the participants 
in a Comparative Literature seminar at the University of British 
Columbia, where the paper had its origin; to Barbara Sinnemann, 
whose MA thesis on English translations of Das Urteil was written 
at Queen's University under my direction; and to Roberta Ascarelli 
of the University of Toronto, who kindly provided me with Italian 
translations of Das Urteil. 
19 
have been telling lies about Joseph K.M but rather "Jemand musste 
Josef K. verleumdet haben" (Der Prozess, 1964, p. 7). What is perhaps 
not so clear is who (or what) this "Kafka" I can talk about so glibly 
here was (or is). For most of us, most of the time, certainly, it is merely 
a commonplace and completely untroubling metonymy to say that we 
are reading "Kafka" or "Dostoevsky" or "Molière" when what we are 
really reading is the body of work produced by them. Nor, usually, is 
the metonymy any more troubling if the texts we are actually reading 
happen to be in translation rather than the original, and few of us would 
consider we were being anything less than totally truthful in claiming 
to have read, say, the Bible, even if we were completely ignorant of 
either Hebrew or Greek. Likewise, as good academics, we have all 
certainly read Homer and Virgil, Dante and Goethe, Cervantes and 
Shakespeare, Tolstoy and Proust. Or have we? Are we really being as 
entirely truthful as we may very well think we are? 
The notion that translation is always more or less a tissue of 
lies on a more obvious level is, of course, an easy commonplace, a 
popular wisdom. "Traduttore, traditore," as the Italian aphorism has it, 
'Translator, traitor.' These traitorous translations in turn, as the 
matching French aphorism, with cheerful sexism, puts it, are like "les 
belles infidèles" — the more beautiful they are, the less likely they are 
to be faithful.2 And the contemporary analogue of this wisdom is that 
the movie, as we all know, is never as good as the book. Exceptions 
merely prove the general, if more or less unquestioned rule. But what 
does "as good as" mean? What constitutes treason? How do we 
measure fidelity? What, in other words, are the concepts of textual 
authority that underwrite, inter alia, our notions of evaluation as far as 
translation is concerned? 
Traditionally, translation has been imbued with and surrounded 
by what one might call a quasi-religious myth of originality. We see 
this at work, for example, in a statement such as Horst Frenz's that "in 
general, translations date more quickly than their original" (1961,1973, 
p. 119). Why, we might well ask ourselves, should this be so? Pope's 
translation of Homer, for example, began to appear in 1715, just a year 
2. For a collection of such aphorisms, see Koller (1984), pp. 48-51. 
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after the appearance of one of his "own" works, The Rape of the Lock. 
Have these two texts really aged over the intervening centuries at 
differential rates? And if so, why? And what does "in general" mean? 
Perhaps it refers to that other common manifestation of the myth of 
originality, the casual and widespread assumption that translations by 
"real authors already" are somehow superior, better, more the "real 
thing" than translations by individuals who are not real authors but 
merely members of that presumably inferior literary breed, translators, 
who by definition are incapable of producing the real thing — unless, 
of course, like Pope, they write a book of their "own," an original text, 
which then, by definition, will at least have some defensible claim to 
being considered the "real thing." And again, what of "translations" that 
turn out not to have been translations after all? James Macpherson's 
alleged translations in the 1760s from the Gaelic of Ossian, for 
example, eventually turned out to be simple forgeries. But simple 
forgeries in this case meant Macpherson's own original work. Does he 
(or should he), any moral considerations aside, consequently occupy a 
rightfully higher rank in literary history precisely because he was a 
literary swindler? Where, in other words, is the "real thing" here? Is 
there, indeed, any such thing, here or elsewhere, as the real thing? 
The myth of originality reveals itself most obviously in the 
master/servant relationship that has traditionally obtained between so-
called original texts and their translations — or, more accurately, 
between original authors and their translators. In this relationship the 
translator's task was to become as transparent, as inconspicuous, in a 
word, as absent as possible in order that the creative originality of the 
author might shine through unimpeded and unimpaired. This model of 
translation, moreover, was only one aspect of a larger model of reading 
in general, for even the original author's work was itself to some degree 
already a translation, since literary works are constructed out of 
language, and the task of language in this relationship was likewise to 
become as transparent and inconspicuous and essentially absent as 
possible in order that the real meaning of the author might shine 
through without distortion or distraction. The formula governing the 
relationship of original and translation was thus as follows: the original 
author is to the transparent translator as original meaning is to 
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transparent language. Or as master is to servant, for in this scheme of 
things translation serves "literature," which in turn serves truth.3 
So whom are you reading when you read, say, Kafka in 
translation? Under the traditional dispensation, as outlined here, the 
answer could only be that one read as if reading Kafka: on the one hand 
what one read was really Kafka, but on the other hand it was not really 
Kafka, but Kafka through a glass, a more or less dirty glass, darkly. The 
translator, essentially an imposter, was essentially also more or less of 
a nuisance — and ideally less, of course, for the ideal translator in this 
scheme of things is entirely invisible, writes himself (like the Cheshire 
Cat) entirely out of existence, out of the text. 
Thus what we may call the traditional model of translation, 
based on the twin pillars of authorial originality and authorial authority 
— and deriving ultimately from the essentially religious concept, at 
once theocentric and theocratic, of a divine revelation. In the aftermath 
of structuralism and its assorted developments, however, there has been 
a paradigm shift in the late-twentieth-century concept of the role of the 
translator, just as there has been in the case of the literary critic. The 
new paradigm is based less on the mysteries of divine revelation than 
on the semiotics of literary communication and owes less to the 
radically centralized power structure of pre-industrial political and 
religious autocracy than to the decentralized structures of information 
management in our (post)modern, (post)democratic, (post)industrial 
Western societies. My aim here is not to attempt any would-be 
comprehensive outline of contemporary translation theories,4 but it can 
none the less be confidently asserted that one crucial common factor is 
the notion of textuality, more specifically the notion that all translations 
are first and foremost metatexts — that is to say, linguistic texts about 
other linguistic texts. This metatextual model of translation practice sees 
3. Terry Eagleton (1983, esp. pp. 1-16) draws attention in exemplary 
fashion to the parallel relationship traditionally held to obtain between 
theory, criticism, and literature: the task of literary theory is to serve 
literary criticism, whose task in turn is to serve literature. 
4. For such surveys, see Bassnett-McGuire (1980), Koller (1984); see 
also Lefevere (1982). 
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all translation as essentially compound discourse, discourse about other 
discourse, and as a result the authority that was formerly seen as 
residing solely and unshakeably with the historical, empirical author and 
his inalienable claim to originality is now seen as displaceable 
throughout an entire textual system, which includes not only the author 
and his text but also a potentially infinite series of translators, who may 
subsequently, as new "authors," create their "own" texts based to a 
greater or lesser degree on their encounter with this one, originary text. 
Each of the new "Kafkas" produced under this new theoretical 
dispensation has a more or less defensible claim to being the "real" 
Kafka, for that reality is now grounded in textual rather than 
biographical authority, whether or not the text under analysis is the only 
true original or a displaced variant of it. 
Again, this new model of translation is also only one aspect of 
a more general model of reading — whose broader resonances may also 
be observed in areas of critical practice not owing any direct allegiance 
to structuralist ideas in the narrower sense, such as the New Critical 
theory of the autotelic text. In the metatextual model of compound 
discourse author A produces text B which is read by reader C. But 
readers are of very different kinds, and their processing of the textual 
information is infinitely variable. Indeed, in this scheme of things no 
reader can ever read the same text twice, for as individuals we are 
subject throughout our existence to ineluctable change, and the texts we 
read duly change with us. Some readers, moreover, are more productive 
than other readers, and while every reader potentially produces his or 
her own text in processing the text of author A, some readers go on to 
actually write down their own texts, in which case one of the labels we 
can give to such readers is that of translator. Every translator is both a 
reader and an author, in other words, and every translator of Kafka, for 
example, constructs in the required target language, as author, an 
analogue to the Kafka he has reconstructed as a reader in the source 
language of the text. But this is essentially true of any reader, for all 
our readings are always simultaneously reconstructions and re-
constructions, decodings and encodings, taking apart and putting 
together again a text that is simultaneously the same and uniquely 
different. A translator, in short, under the new theoretical dispensation, 
is nothing more or less than a fully consistent reader, a reader with the 
courage of his or her convictions. Every translation of Kafka is a new 
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reading of Kafka, and every reading is at least potentially a new 
translation. 
So, once again, who (and where) is Kafka? For the traditional 
model of the older paradigm, as we have seen, Kafka is a unique 
historical individual of genius, born in Prague in 1883, the unique locus 
of the text's authority (whether in translation or not), the ultimate origin 
of all its meaning — and essentially the same for every reader. For the 
metatextual model of the new paradigm, on the other hand, authority is 
displaced from the original author to the interaction of individual texts 
and individual readers, and "Kafka" is the Kafka constructed by each 
individual reader in a proliferating string of readings (whether in 
translation or not). But it is also possible, still operating by the game 
rules of the new paradigm, to theorize a third — if entirely 
"impractical" — answer to the question, which we may call the 
intertextual model (and on whose hypothetical workings we shall now 
concentrate): for this model, Kafka is neither a unique and unchanging 
individual nor a proliferation of endlessly variable individual readings 
but rather an entire shifting system of potentially endless variable 
readings, the sum, that is to say, of all the translations and readings of 
Kafka that have ever existed or will ever exist in any language. If the 
locus of textual authority was firmly identified with the historical, 
empirical author in our first model (which is prestructuralist in its 
assumptions), and displaced on to individual textual encounters in the 
second (essentially structuralist in its assumptions), in the third, which 
is poststructuralist in its general assumptions, the locus of authority is 
dispersed, disseminated, diffused throughout the entire textual system. 
This translation of authority is, once again, by no means 
limited to translated texts, for all three of these models are models of 
reading in general rather than just of reading translations. Texts in 
translation, however, provide a particularly graphic set of examples of 
the issues involved. Authority is essentially extratextual in the first 
model, the traditional reader reading through the words on the page 
(whether translated or not) to the living thoughts and intentions of the 
unique and uniquely authoritative historical author. In the second model 
authority is essentially metatextual in that it begins with the concrete 
text on the page, sometimes actually and always potentially translated 
by the further textualizing process of its reception by successive readers. 
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In the third model authority is essentially intertextual, for this model, 
subscribing to poststructuralist notions of textual interaction, duly holds 
that a Kafka read in Spanish cannot be the "same" Kafka read in French 
or English or German, that your Kafka is not my Kafka, and that my 
Kafka today is not my Kafka of yesterday or tomorrow — and yet all 
of these synecdochic Kafkas together comprise the macrotext we also 
call "Kafka," the Kafka phenomenon, the Kafka system. Where the 
traditional model is unitary (one Kafka for all readings), and the 
matatextual model is pluralist (one Kafka for each reading), the 
intertextual model is theoretically holistic (since all possible readings 
constitute one Kafka). The sum of this intertextual system, of course, 
must always remain incalculable, and its "one" Kafka infinitely 
ungraspable, not merely because of the linguistic and other limitations 
of individual readers, but because any attempt to sum the system would 
inevitably be an exercise in paradox, since the macro-Kafka it produced 
would then have to be included in a new mapping, and so on in endless 
circular regression. 
The impossibility of the endeavour as a whole need not deter 
us from exploring the beginnings of one or two of its proliferating 
pathways, however, and we shall now turn our attention to this 
experiment. To this end the reader will find an appendix to this paper 
containing the opening and closing sentences of Kafka's story Das 
Urteil — in the original German, three different English translations, 
two French versions, two Italian versions, and one Spanish rendering. 
Ideally the selection should, of course, be very much larger, but it will 
suffice to demonstrate the general principle of the intertextual model. 
The story of Das Urteil, to establish the context, is quickly 
summarized: Georg Bendemann, a young businessman, writes to a 
bachelor friend in Russia to announce his recent engagement and shortly 
thereafter informs his elderly father that he has just written the letter. 
Whereupon his father accuses him (a) of having invented the friend and 
(b) of having disgraced his dead mother's memory by the planned 
marriage. Moreover, (c) the friend, non-existent or not, is really his 
friend; (d) the girl would be his too, if he wished; and (e) since Georg 
had always wished his father dead, now he sentences Georg himself to 
death, by drowning. Georg rushes from the house and throws himself 
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off a bridge.5 Let us now proceed to look at some selected phrases in 
all nine of the versions before us — but with the specific understanding 
that we are not going to treat one as the original and the other eight as 
more or less unsuccessful renderings, but rather (and this is the point of 
our experiment) that we shall treat all nine as a single multivoiced, 
translingual "original," an interweaving and interwovenness of voices in 
which the individual voices will sometimes agree and sometimes differ 
— but each voice will always relativize each of the others and, in so 
doing, put itself continually in question as well. We can, to begin with, 
let Kafka's German be our point of departure, a privileged voice, but 
this is a matter merely of convenience rather than necessity, since we 
could just as easily declare the Spanish version to be our privileged 
voice and the German version to be just one more of the many other 
competing voices. Ideally, no single one of the individual voices would 
be privileged for the purposes of this exercise, the multipart harmony 
of these textual spheres emerging precisely from the interplay of all the 
voices simultaneously, with now one and now another of them seizing 
our attention by virtue of a particularly brilliantly or strikingly executed 
effect.6 (In order to suggest something of the nature of this interplay 
I will refer to the versions only by the letter and number identifying 
them in the appendix, rather than by the name of their individual 
author.) 
"Es war an einem Sonntagvormittag im schönsten Frühjahr," 
begins the German Al. We notice that while the German superlative 
"im schönsten Frühjahr" ostensibly draws attention to the beauty of this 
time of year, only two of the other voices do so, the French A5 
referring to "la beauté du printemps" and the Italian A8 to the 
5. The reader need hardly be warned as to the highly dubious status of 
such neatly phrased summaries. This, after all, is only one of many 
such summaries I could have provided, and I am only one reader 
among many. 
6. It should not be forgotten, of course, that I find particular effects 
striking in the first place because of my own overall reading of Dos 
Urteil. Another reader might well ignore the effects I find most 
striking and focus instead on shadings that Ï ignore or have simply 
not been able to see. 
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"momento più bello delia primavera." The English voices all prefer to 
employ a metaphor of height instead — "in the (very) height of spring" 
— a metaphor that will become startlingly concrete in the climactic 
scene of the narrative, when Georg's father springs to his feet on the 
bed, even touching the ceiling with one hand to steady himself, as he 
pronounces judgement from on high. The Spanish A9 employs a 
metaphor of fullness instead — "en plena primavera" — while the 
French A6 ironically speaks of "une année qui débutait splendidement," 
echoed by the Italian A7, "faceva un tempo splendido." "Georg," as he 
is called in German and Spanish and by two of the English voices, 
metamorphoses into "George" in A4, "Georges" in both French voices, 
and "Giorgio" for both Italian voices, a cultural change of key 
interestingly paralleling the polarity of familiarity and strangeness 
informing the relationship of Georg (as we may continue to call him) 
and his nameless friend in a stylized Russia. Georg is "ein junger 
Kaufmann" in Al, a "merchant" in A2, a "businessman" in A3 and A4, 
a "commerciante" in A7 and A8, a "comerciante" in A9. For both of the 
French voices, however, he is "un jeune négociant," and this catches 
with absolute precision the element of competition and rivalry that will 
emerge as existing between Georg and his Russian friend on the one 
hand, Georg and his father on the other. A "négociant" is one who 
negotiates, employs strategies, devises game-plans, in order to gain a 
superior position, and the course of the struggle between Georg and his 
father that will come to dominate the story can be traced in detail as 
constituting a series of such antagonistic game situations. (If I might 
interrupt the rules of my own game momentarily and interject a 
comment of an evaluative nature at this point, by the way, here is one 
example of a translation that is clearly superior to the original — but 
only, of course, for the purposes of this particular interpretive angle.) 
Georg's friend in Russia is described in German as being "im 
Ausland," which on the one hand simply means "abroad," as all three 
English versions neutrally phrase it, but also, and far less neutrally, 
"l'étranger" of both French voices, the "estero" of both Italian voices, 
27 
and "el extranjero" of the Spanish.7 Georg "hatte gerade einen Brief 
an [diesen] sich im Ausland befindenden Jugendfreund beendet [und] 
verschloss ihn in spielerischer Langsamkeit," according to Al. We 
notice in passing the polarity of youth and age between the 
"Jugendfreund" of the German and the "old friend" of two of the 
English voices. We notice too that while for all the English and French 
and one of the Italian voices the friend was quite neutrally "living" 
abroad — "résidant" (A5), "habitait" (A6), "viveva" (A8) — in German 
he is "sich im Ausland befindend," and for the Spanish (echoed less 
forcefully in the Italian A7) the friend likewise "se encontraba en el 
extranjero," which taken completely literally means "he met himself (or 
found himself) in that which was strange."8 Would Georg too "find" 
himself, "meet" himself as if he were a stranger, if he too had the 
courage or the resolve or whatever it took to risk leaving the security 
of the known and the familiar for the unknown and the strange? There 
are (at least) two sides to everything, of course — including writing a 
letter, which for Al Georg had just "beendet." For two of the English 
voices (A2, A3) he had just "finished" this letter, just as for both Italian 
voices he "aveva finito," or in other words had simply ceased to write 
any more, while for the third English voice he had "completed" it, or 
in other words had brought it to a successful conclusion. The same 
tension is exactly reflected in the two French voices: A6 prefers 
"terminer," simply to reach an end, while A5 prefers the more active 
"achever," to achieve or bring about an end, a choice also favoured by 
the Spanish, where Georg "acababa de escribir," which taken quite 
rigorously at its word — like the French "achever" — means that he 
had brought his writing to a head. We notice, incidentally, that the 
Spanish is the only voice that actually mentions "escribir" 'writing' at 
this point — all the other voices, including the German, simply refer to 
7. It should, of course, also not be forgotten that I have no choice but 
to read all of the texts as a reader whose first language is and remains 
English. My ear for nuance and "neutrality" will therefore clearly be 
quite different from that of a non-English speaker. This, however, is 
entirely in accordance with the assumptions of our third model. 
8. The innocence of the "literal" translation here is, of course, also 
entirely questionable. 
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the finishing or completion of "a letter," "einen Brief," "une lettre," "una 
lettera," "una carta." 
This letter Georg had put in its envelope "mit spielerischer 
Langsamkeit," and the elusiveness of his possible motivation here is 
reflected in the variety of interpretations given to this phrase in the 
different voices: for A2 it was done in a "slow and dreamy fashion," for 
A3 he "toyed with it," for A4 it was done with "frivolous deliberation," 
for A6 it was simply "avec lenteur" and for A7 "lentamente," while A5 
is clear that it was "avec une lenteur feinte," A8 talks of a "lentezza 
compiaciuta, quasi giocherellando," and A9 has it done "distraída y 
languidamente." The complexity of Georg's motivation here is a 
reflection of the complex processes that ostensibly impelled his alleged 
friend to leave home. Tliis nameless friend had been "mit seinem 
Fortkommen zu Hause unzufrieden," as the German puts it in a 
deconstructive double entendre, "Fortkommen" is progress, but it is also 
"getting away," and "zu Hause," staying at home, is the familiar 
stumbling block to both. Two of the English voices (A3, A4) have him 
dissatisfied merely with his "progress," just as for A7 he is "scontento 
della sua esistenza in famiglia," and one of the French likewise (A6) 
has him "mécontent de piétiner au pays," dissatisfied with marking time, 
shuffling his feet. The other French voice (A5) has him "insatisfait de 
la situation qu'on lui avait faite," where progress has more overtly given 
way to stasis, and this is a situation that has ostensibly been thrust upon 
him, apparently through no fault or desire of his own. The passivity of 
his "situation" and the unattainability of any active "progress" leads in 
A2 to his being "dissatisfied with his prospects" (emphasis mine), as 
also in the Spanish A9, where he is "disconforme con las perspectivas 
que su pátria le ofrecía." The "prospects" and "perspectivas" here are 
parodically reflected in the view or prospect observed by Georg from 
his window in the same paragraph, while the Spanish also not only 
alerts us through its use of "perspectivas" to the various game strategies 
that will be employed in the narrative but also stresses both the 
passivity of the friend — who is "offered11 prospects — and the power 
to offer or withhold of the "pátria," the land precisely of the father(s). 
The Italian A7 echoes the passivity but not the nom du père of the 
Spanish: the friend was "insoddisfatto per quanto gli offriva il suo 
paese." 
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This friend, Georg reflects in Al, "[hatte sich] vor Jahren 
schon nach Russland [...] förmlich geflüchtet." He "had actually run 
away" according to A2, "had quite simply decamped" according to A3, 
had "quite literally escaped" according to A4. But "literally" and 
"förmlich" are both slippery words, and this is — once again — well 
caught by the difference between the two French voices, A6 with 
"littéralement enfui," A5 with "pour ainsi dire enfui." Everything that 
happens in a literary text is both "literal" and "so to speak," "pour ainsi 
dire." It is precisely the moment of indecision between the actual and 
the possible here and throughout Das Urteil that gives the text its 
compellingly provocative and enigmatic character. Das Urteil, in 
biographical terms, can clearly be read as about necessary decisions that 
were vital for Kafka at this point in his life: the decision whether to 
leave home or not, whether to stand up to his father once and for all or 
not, whether to risk marriage or not, and no doubt most important of all, 
whether any of these other decisions would endanger the one decision 
he had already and irrevocably taken, namely to go on writing at all 
costs. But Das Urteil is a literary text, and therefore its aboutness is 
more important than what it is about, its allusiveness is more important 
than its referentiality, its status as a literary, self-reflexive text is more 
important — for the particular theoretical game we are playing here at 
any rate — than its status as a real-world biographical text. Kafka, 
notoriously, confided to Max Brod that when he wrote the last sentence 
of Das Urteil — "In diesem Augenblick ging über die Brücke ein 
geradezu unendlicher Verkehr" (which the reader will find below in 
voices Bl to B9) — he was thinking of a powerful sexual ejaculation, 
"eine starke Ejakulation" (Neumann, 1981, p. 36). The serious-minded 
Brod, perennial Boswell to Kafka's Johnson, duly went away and wrote 
this down for posterity, and we need not concern ourselves here with 
the exact degree to which his scholarly leg was being pulled. As readers 
of a literary text, however, our leg is always being pulled, for the 
literary text always, by its very nature, says one thing and means 
another. 
The friend in Russia, "[w]ie er erzählte, hatte [...] keine rechte 
Verbindung mit der dortigen Kolonie seiner Landsleute, aber auch fast 
keinen gesellschaftlichen Verkehr mit einheimischen Familien und 
richtete sich so für ein endgültiges Junggesellentum ein." In this 
shadow world of "Verkehr," where "Landsleute" are strangers and 
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strangers are "einheimisch," the nameless friend has "fast keinen [...] 
Verkehr," no "intercourse," as all three English voices have it, no 
"relation sociale" for A5, no "rapport" for A6, no "rapporti" for A7 and 
A8, no "amistades" for A9, a friend in name who is nobody's friend in 
deed. When the "geradezu unendlicher Verkehr" passes over the bridge 
of the last paragraph, the same bridge we already know from the first 
paragraph but from which Georg has now let himself drop, there is 
(Max Brod notwithstanding) no "intercourse" in the English versions 
any more, only an "unending," "endless" "stream of traffic," "un trafic 
immense," as the French B5 puts it, "un traffico interminabile" for B7. 
As interpreters, critics, translators, readers in short, we are in a sense 
all part of that endless traffic over Kafka's bridge, "una interminable 
fila," as the Spanish has it, "un interminabile andirivieni" for the Italian 
B8, interminably going and coming, filing past, circling around the 
Kafkan text, in what B6 calls "une circulation littéralement folle." 
One final key phrase with which to conclude our prelude to an 
endless reading of a tiny fragment of the Kafka system: the title. "Das 
Urteil" is rendered by all three English voices as "The Judg(e)ment" and 
by the French A5 likewise as "Le Jugement." But judgement is only 
one note, as we might put it, of the three-note chord that constitutes a 
judicial "Urteil," which contains first the process of forming a 
judgement, then the judicial utterance of the verdict reached, and finally 
the imposition of the punishment appropriate to the crime. The English 
title "The Judg(e)ment" and the French "Le Jugement" emphasize the 
first aspect of this process, the formation of a judicial opinion. The 
second aspect is emphasized by the second French title, "Le Verdict," 
the speaking of what is now judicial truth (verum dictare), and the third 
is underlined both by the Italian "La Condanna" and by the Spanish "La 
Condena," the condemnation, the imposition of the sentence. The final 
step in the judicial process exceeds the reach of the title in any of the 
languages examined here, namely the execution of the sentence, the 
death by drowning imposed by Georg's father. But, we might well ask 
ourselves, is that sentence ever carried out anyway? We see Georg, his 
own apparent executioner, let himself drop from the bridge, indeed. 
What we do not see is Georg ever reaching the water, much less 
drowning. Suspended between the inception and the completion of the 
act of self-execution, Georg finally leaves the reader where he has 
always been, faced with the necessity precisely of reading — forming 
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his own judgement, passing his own sentence, executing his own 
decision. 
For our first model of reading, the traditional, prestructuralist 
model, translation is essentially a reluctantly tolerated but sometimes 
necessary evil allowing readers to approach the work of authors 
otherwise linguistically inaccessible. The grateful reader's reaction is to 
ignore the translation as much as possible, indeed to treat it as non-
existent once he has been reassured by competent authorities that it is 
as faithful as possible to the original work he would preferably be 
reading directly rather than at one remove. For the second, the 
metatextual model of reading, drawing on structuralist concepts of 
textual interaction, translation emerges, in a dramatic paradigm shift, 
from this state of marginalized toleration to become the very template 
of all reading, all interpretation. For the first model, founded on the 
centrality of original, authorial authority, the reader reads in spite of a 
translation; for the second model, decentred, destabilized, and founded 
on the fragmentation of authority, translation is the only option there 
can ever be. For the third, the intertextual model of reading, drawing on 
poststructuralist conceptions of textuality, all the possible "translations" 
together constitute a parodie new, but endlessly inaccessible "original" 
— authority recentred (if only through the looking glass), but centre and 
circle coincide, and their circumference is incalculable. 
Intriguing though such a concept might be in theoretical terms, 
our intertextual, macrotextual model might also seem at first sight to be 
little more than a self-sufficient academic game, a critical joke, of the 
kind in which contemporary literary theory increasingly abounds.9 And, 
indeed, if taken exclusively as a model of translation, our third model 
obviously has extremely limited practical possibilities, since very few 
readers will be able to go in any meaningful way beyond a comparative 
consideration of translations in three or four of the more familiar 
foreign languages. Once again, however, the macrotextual model of 
translation is only one aspect of a more general model of reading, and 
for all that its paradoxical nature is abundantly clear once we attempt 
to employ it comprehensively, we all, in fact, use it quite practically and 
9. For further discussion of the comic moment in contemporary literary 
theory, see O'Neill (1990), esp. pp. 54-65. 
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quite frequently — indeed potentially always — in our reading of 
literary texts, even if we may do so both largely unconsciously and in 
a very much reduced application. MMyM Odyssey, for example, is made 
up not of a single text immaculately preserved in my mind, but rather 
is the result of several different readings, at several different ages, in 
several different places, with several different degrees of concentration, 
of several different translations, combined with occasional study over 
two or three decades of selected passages in the original Greek, more 
or less eroded memories of lectures I have heard and books and articles 
I have read over many years on Homer, not to mention various half-
understood popular treatments of the tale or parts of it read or seen 
since childhood in comic books, children's classics, the movies, and on 
TV.10 What is true of my Odyssey is equally true of my Homer, my 
Dante, my Shakespeare, my Kafka — and my "Kafka" is not your 
"Kafka," nor yours mine. 
Most of the time, of course, when I sit down as a critic to 
examine a literary text, I merely allow this macrotextual, intertextual, 
contextual information to function, more or less unconsciously, as a 
background of general knowledge to my more immediate endeavours. 
On a more conscious and more practical level, I essentially have to 
decide whether to operate according to the rules of either our first 
model or our second model, and if I should happen to be dealing with 
matters involving translation this will eventually bring me back, sooner 
or later, to the question of evaluation. As long as I adhere to the 
traditional model of reading, neither the traditional questions nor the 
traditional answers have changed, and fidelity to (assumed) authorial 
intention remains the unshakeable touchstone. Once I choose to operate 
by the rules of the second model, however, I am immediately faced 
with the question as to how one is supposed to evaluate a translation in 
this brave but unstable new world of floating authority. 
The most productive answer here seems clearly to be that any 
evaluation will be based less usefully on traditional notions of fidelity 
to authorial norms than it will be on the same criteria we can most 
10. For further discussion of this reduced variant of the intertextual 
model, see Lefevere (1982), pp. 148-149. 
33 
usefully employ when judging the relative validity of any of competing 
sets of readings or interpretations. These are spelled out in exemplary 
fashion by Paul Armstrong in his PMLA article of 1983, and they are 
three in number. The first of them is the criterion of inclusiveness: any 
interpretation — and every translation is an interpretation — should 
capture a maximum of the information present in the text interpreted. 
To translate the title "Das Urteil" by "The Decision," for example, or 
"The Sentence," both of which options could be argued for to a certain 
point, would clearly fail to meet the criterion of inclusiveness, since 
neither captures nuances of meaning that, as we have seen, can be 
regarded as crucial to the narrative. The second criterion is that of 
persuasiveness: to translate the title as "The Opinion," for example, 
would not only fail to be inclusive but would also signally fail to 
exercise any power of persuasion that this was indeed the most 
appropriate solution. The third criterion is that of suggestiveness, and 
here the translation of the word "Kaufmann" by the French "négociant" 
rather than the English "merchant" or "businessman," as discussed 
above, provides an excellent example of how this criterion is brilliantly 
met in this instance by the French and met with only marginal adequacy 
by the English. 
These are minimal cases, of course, dealing with single words 
or phrases only. The problem becomes massively more complicated 
when we attempt to evaluate a 500-page or a thousand-page translation. 
But this is as it has always been, and there is no getting away from it: 
every translation, like the text it translates, is made up of individual 
words individually chosen, and every single word is problematic. One 
man's meat will continue to remain — and should continue to remain 
— another man's poison, and our three criteria too, while providing us 
with a useful set of evaluative yardsticks, should certainly not be seen 
as offering any definitive and "scientific" solution. There is no such 
final solution, whether to the evaluation of translations or interpretations 
or the sort of theoretical models I have been discussing in this paper. 
Every reading, every interpretation, every translation, every theoretical 
model is a particular strategy, a particular game, played with more or 
less accomplishment, but always according to its own particular rules. 
Some games, some models, are better for some purposes, for some 
people, than others are. Our evaluative criteria will always depend in the 
end on where we stand — and why we find ourselves standing there 
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rather than somewhere else. "Give me a place to stand, and I will move 
the world," Archimedes is reported — in translation, of course — to 
have said. Reformulated for the purposes of modern literary theory, the 
Archimedes principle retranslates today as "Give me a place to read, 
and I will rewrite the world — subject only to the equal right of all 
other readers to do likewise." 
Queen's University 
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Appendix 
Al Es war an einem Sonntagvormittag im schönsten Frühjahr. 
Georg Bendemann, ein junger Kaufmann [...] hatte gerade 
einen Brief an einen sich im Ausland befindenden 
Jugendfreund beendet [und] verschloss ihn in spielerischer 
Langsamkeit [...]. Er dachte darüber nach, wie dieser Freund, 
mit seinem Fortkommen zu Hause unzufrieden, vor Jahren 
schon nach Russland sich förmlich geflüchtet hatte [...]. Wie 
er erzählte, hatte er keine rechte Verbindung mit der dortigen 
Kolonie seiner Landsleute, aber auch fast keinen 
gesellschaftlichen Verkehr mit einheimischen Familien und 
richtete sich so für ein endgültiges Junggesellentum ein. 
(Kafka, "Das Urteil," p. 8) 
A2 It was a Sunday morning in the very height of spring. Georg 
Bendemann, a young merchant [...] had just finished a letter to 
an old friend of his who was now living abroad [and] had put 
it into its envelope in a slow and dreamy fashion [...]. He was 
thinking about his friend, who had actually run away to Russia 
some years before, being dissatisfied with his prospects at 
home [...]. By his own account he had no regular connection 
with the colony of his fellow countrymen out there and almost 
no social intercourse with Russian families, so that he was 
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resigning himself to becoming a permanent bachelor. ("The 
Judgment," trans. Muir and Muir, pp. 49-50) 
It was a Sunday morning in the height of spring. Georg 
Bendemann, a young businessman [...] had just finished a letter 
to an old friend of his who was now living abroad [and] toyed 
with it for a while as he slowly sealed it [...]. He recalled how 
many years ago this friend of his, dissatisfied with his progress 
at home, had quite simply decamped to Russia [...]. By his 
own account he had no real contact with the colony of his 
fellow-countrymen out there, and indeed hardly any social 
intercourse with Russian families, so that he was resigning 
himself to becoming a permanent bachelor. ("The Judgment," 
trans. Pasley, p. 1) 
It was a Sunday morning at the height of spring. George 
Bendemann, a young businessman [...] had just completed a 
letter to a boyhood friend now living abroad [and] sealed it 
with frivolous deliberation [...]. He was thinking about how the 
friend, not content with his progress at home, had years before 
quite literally escaped to Russia [...]. By his own account he 
had no proper contact with his compatriots, who formed a 
colony in the city, and virtually no social intercourse with 
Russian families either, so that he was settling down to a life 
of permanent bachelordom. ("The Judgement," trans. 
Underwood, p. 45) 
C'était un dimanche matin, dans la beauté du printemps. 
Georges Bendemann, un jeune négociant [...] venait d'achever 
une lettre à un ami d'enfance résidant à l'étranger [et] l'avait 
fermée avec une lenteur feinte [...]. Ses pensées suivaient cet 
ami qui, insatisfait de la situation qu'on lui avait faite chez lui, 
s'était, quelques années auparavant, pour ainsi dire enfui en 
Russie [...]. D'après ses récits, non seulement il ne s'était 
guère lié avec ses compatriotes, mais il n'avait également 
aucune relation sociale avec les familles indigènes et, de cette 
façon, se vouait à un célibat définitif. ("Le Jugement," trans. 
Meylan, pp. 9-13) 
C'était un matin de dimanche, par une année qui débutait 
splendidement, Georges Bendemann, un jeune négociant [...] 
venait de terminer une lettre à un ami de jeunesse qui habitait 
l'étranger [et] commença par la fermer avec lenteur [...]. Il 
réfléchissait au destin de cet ami qui, mécontent de piétiner au 
pays, s'était littéralement enfui en Russie [...]. Il n'avait, a ce 
qu'il disait, aucune relation réelle avec la colonie de ses 
compatriotes, et presque aucun rapport non plus avec la société 
indigène; il semblait donc se préparer un célibat définitif. ("Le 
Verdict," trans. Vialatte, pp. 41-42) 
Era una domenica mattina di primavera, faceva un tempo 
splendide II giovane commerciante Giorgio Bendemann [...] 
aveva appena finito una lettera per un amico di gioventú che 
si trovava all'estero, la chiuse lentamente [...]. Pensava 
all'amico che, insoddisfatto per quanto gli offriva il suo paese, 
parecchi anni avanti era letteralmente fuggito in Russia [...]. 
Raccontava di non avère stretto rapporti con la colónia dei suoi 
compatrioti, mentre ben scarse erano le sue relazioni con la 
gente del posto; era ormai rassegnato a rimanere celibe. ("La 
Condanna," trans. Zampa, p. 99) 
Era una mattinata domenicale nel momento più bello delia 
primavera. Giorgio Bendemann, un giovane commerciante [...] 
aveva finito allora una lettera ad un amico d'infanzia che 
viveva all'estero; la chiuse con una lentezza compiaciuta, quasi 
giocherellando [...]. Meditava sul fatto che questo amico, 
scontento delia sua esistenza in famiglia, già da anni s'era 
come rifugiato in Russia [...]. Secondo quel che raccontava non 
era in rapporti attivi colla colónia dei suoi connazionali, né 
aveva stretto quasi nessuna relazione d'amicizia con famiglie 
del luogo e s'avviava cosi a restar definitivamente scapolo. 
("La Condanna," trans. Paoli, p. 141) 
Era una maflana de domingo, en plena primavera. Georg 
Bendemann, joven comerciante [...] acababa de escribir una 
carta a un amigo de infância que se encontraba en el extranjero 
[y] la cerro distraída y languidamente [...]. Pensaba en su 
amigo, que algunos afios antes, disconforme con las perspec-
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tivas que su pátria le ofrecia, se había ido a Rusia [...]. Segun 
él decia, no tenia mayores relaciones con la colónia de 
compatriotas en aquella ciudad ni tampoco amistades entre las 
famílias del lugar, de modo que su destino parecia ser una 
definitiva soltería. ("La Condena," trans. Wilcock, pp. 9-10) 
Bl In diesem Augenblick ging über die Brücke ein geradezu 
unendlicher Verkehr. ("Das Urteil," p. 19) 
B2 At this moment an unending stream of traffic was just going 
over the bridge. ("The Judgment," trans. Muir and Muir, p. 63) 
B3 At that moment the traffic was passing over the bridge in a 
positively unending stream. ("The Judgment," trans. Pasley, p. 
12) 
B4 Crossing the bridge at that moment was a simply endless 
stream of traffic. ("The Judgement," trans. Underwood, p. 56) 
B5 En cet instant, il y avait justement sur le pont un trafic 
immense. ("Le Jugement," trans. Meylan, p. 63) 
B6 À ce moment, il y avait sur le pont une circulation 
littéralement folle. ("Le Verdict," trans. Vialatte, p. 53) 
B7 In quel momento il ponte era percorso da un traffico 
interminabile. ("La Condanna," trans. Zampa, p. 113) 
B8 In quel momento sul ponte c'era un interminabile andirivieni 
di persone e di veicoli. ("La Condanna," trans. Paoli, p. 154) 
B9 En ese momento una interminable fila de vehículos pasaba por 
el puente. ("La Condena," trans. Wilcock, p. 21) 
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